Thursday, June 20, 2024

REAL PAGE SOFTWARE AND THE CURRENT HOUSING CRISIS

 Another must-read article from The Prospect and Maureen Tkacik 

https://prospect.org/infrastructure/housing/2024-06-18-how-algorithm-turned-apartment-pools-green/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR01jXhY8ueja6JANhjlQUJvz0EqvHkcB7fLoA2eyOLL1516vY5oTb78Tl8_aem_ZmFrZWR1bW15MTZieXRlcw

By now, you have probably heard of Yieldstar, the private equity–owned software that numerous plaintiff’s attorneys, tenant advocates, and state attorneys general say is actually a front for a sprawling nationwide cartel that fixes rent prices to ludicrous heights and has caused the cost of an apartment to surge between 50 and 80 percent over the past seven years in several of the markets where the software is employed. In theory, and in its early days, Yieldstar offered property managers “recommendations” for pricing and duration of leases based on real-time data on what competitors were offering. But by the time Yieldstar parent RealPage acquired its biggest competitor, Lease Rent Options, from the hotel price-fixing giant Rainmaker in 2017, the algorithm had metamorphosed from a tool for informing pricing decisions into a weapon for systemically and liberally hiking them to “way too high” levels, to quote a leasing manager in one of the many lawsuits. RealPage has also been accused of retaliating against anyone who balked or attempted to circumvent the program, with newer “clients” especially singled out for indoctrination and surveillance to root out “rogue” leasing agents and ensure maximum compliance with the system’s demands.

RealPage not only raised the rent, but it baked eternal rent hyperinflation into the forecasting math of multifamily housing.

Reading the most recent version of a class action complaint, brought by 12 tenants in federal court in Tennessee, it’s easy to see why the FBI is digging into the case. The effect of Yieldstar’s market dominance and discipline has been utterly staggering, and neither RealPage nor its clients betray any uncertainty over the role the company has played in gouging tenants. Since 2016, rents have climbed 76 percent in Phoenix, 63 percent in Las Vegas, 80 percent in Atlanta, 66 percent in Wilmington, North Carolina, and more than 50 percent in Portland, Seattle, Charlotte, Nashville, and Dallas. One multifamily executive quoted in an antitrust lawsuit recalls, “We let [Yieldstar] push as hard as it would go, and we saw increases as high as 20 percent … Left to our own devices, I can assure you we would have never pushed rents that hard.” And in a 2021 promotional video cheering on the nation’s unprecedented 14 percent year-over-year average rent increase, RealPage executive Andrew Bowen said, “I think [Yieldstar is] driving it, quite honestly.”

And yet, to blame RealPage for the fact that rents are too damn high may actually understate the company’s impact on the state of apartment living in America. Because as the Morningstar DBRS report—and multiple others that directly reference Yieldstar—suggests, RealPage not only raised the rent, but it baked eternal rent hyperinflation into the forecasting math of multifamily housing, fueling a dramatic plunge in underwriting standards (and attendant rise in valuations) that lined the pockets of every manner of real estate speculator in 2021 and 2022. This maneuver led to extreme blowback when interest rates—and the floating-rate interest payments owed on the thousands of apartment buildings that changed hands during those years—began to balloon. Perhaps even more insidiously, when mortgage payments rose in 2022 and landlords should have, by conventional market logic, been jumping to fill empty apartments, RealPage instead gave them the tools to extract ever-higher revenues out of powerless renters, no matter how trash-strewn, roach-infested, or crime-ridden their homes had become.

How an ‘Algorithm’ Turned Apartment Pools Green

RealPage, the rent-fixing software company currently under FBI investigation, also has apps for bogus fees, monetizing vacant apartments and inflating toxic property bubbles.

BY 

 

MORE DEVASTATION FROM REAL PAGE AND CORPORATE REAL ESTATE CARTELS

This is a must-read article:

https://prospect.org/infrastructure/housing/2024-05-22-hell-underwater-landlord/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR1Tg-tp-OESBaxixMzjZMzGsUkL2z_Xwujj5ySjDzegqr3-tm7FXhnsALc_aem_ZmFrZWR1bW15MTZieXRlcw

Hell Is an Underwater Landlord

Millions of tenants are trapped in a rotten cycle of overflowing trash, daily water outages, and a healthy rat population.

BY 

 

...four years earlier, Matt Picheny had been an internet advertising consultant in Brooklyn, Brent Ritchie was selling industrial motors in Canada, and Koteswar “Jay” Gajavelli had been running an IT consultancy in Irving, Texas, that claimed Qualcomm and ESPN as clients. But by the start of the pandemic, all three men had begun rebranding themselves as “finfluencers,” social media mavens who promised their growing audience of upper-middle-class telecommuters whose savings had been temporarily inflated by stimulus checks emancipation from wage slavery through the magic of “passive income” generated by apartment complexes. Like a lot of their peers, they immediately set their sights on Houston, which had topped the national population growth charts for decades and boasted such lax tenant protections that two law professors at the University of Texas at Austin wrote a study in 2018 on the city’s “epidemic of dangerous apartments.”

Gajavelli, Ritchie, Picheny, and friends bought the Estates in a package deal with three other buildings in Houston’s Westchase neighborhood, through Gajavelli’s company Applesway Investment Group. The 1,330 apartments in all sold for $119 million, or just under $90,000 a unit, a steep price for buildings that currently advertise one-bedroom apartments starting at $699 a month. But within a few months, Gajavelli would pay $56 million for a massive but severely dilapidated apartment complex across town in East Houston, where a police officer had just been killed trying to arrest a suspect on drug charges, in a transaction that would fail so spectacularly it would become the subject of city council sessions, newspaper editorials, and a tour from the lame-duck mayor.

As a syndicator of other people’s money, Gajavelli had a strong incentive to overpay for properties. His take of every deal, according to a lawsuit filed by 123 of his investors, was calculated as a fixed percentage of the acquisition price, plus a percentage of the monthly rental revenue, and then a percentage of the resale price. The Wall Street Journal reported last year that syndicators like Gajavelli raised $111 billion for real estate investments during the pandemic, and generally collected commissions of between 2 and 5 percent of each deal. In Houston, valuations surged to more than $150,000 per unit, from about $90,000 pre-pandemic, as transaction volume exploded to nearly $10 billion in the fourth quarter of 2021 alone.

The overheated multifamily market would take a devastating toll on apartment dwellers like McMullen-Clarke and her neighbors when the Federal Reserve began to hike interest rates in early 2022, quickly doubling and then tripling the interest payments on Gajavelli’s floating-rate loans. Sidney Beaty, a researcher with the Austin-based low-income housing information resource Texas Housers who previously worked for the state housing department, says it felt like the state was suddenly awash in squalid, barely inhabitable apartment buildings. “You just had a lot of buildings that maybe had decent inspection scores a couple years ago, that were suddenly so deplorable they’re making the evening news,” Beaty said.

LAWSUIT AGAINST REAL PAGE IN TENNESSEE

We need more lawsuits like this! 

https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67174489/728/in-re-realpage-inc-rental-software-antitrust-litigation-no-ii/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR01-NSOhPI8hmj2WbiXjLWbncudvt1k2iNpXNjAFKGykrwhuP2clwDsUuE_aem_ZmFrZWR1bW15MTZieXRlcw


 I. INTRODUCTION 1. From at least January 2016, through the present (the “Conspiracy Period”), Defendants engaged in a nationwide conspiracy to fix and inflate the price of multifamily rental housing across the country. Leveraging their control of the multifamily rental housing market from at least January 2016, Defendants conspired to limit supply and raise multifamily rental housing Case 3:23-md-03071 Document 728 Filed 02/05/24 Page 3 of 302 PageID #: 9023 4 prices, causing substantial damages to Plaintiffs and other members of the Class whose ability to obtain affordable housing depended on getting competitive prices for the units they rented. Several witness accounts, including 12 discussed herein, rental price and occupancy data, economic evidence, and public investigations,1 confirm the anticompetitive conduct taken pursuant to this agreement.


The Defendants:

RealPage, Inc., Thoma Bravo Fund XIII, L.P., Thoma Bravo Fund XIV, L.P., and Thoma Bravo

COMPANY; MID-AMERICA

COMMUNITIES, INC.; MID-AMERICA

APARTMENTS, L.P.; MISSION ROCK

RESIDENTIAL, LLC; MORGAN

PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT COMPANY,

LLC; PINNACLE PROPERTY

MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC;

PROMETHEUS REAL ESTATE GROUP,

INC.; THE RELATED COMPANIES, L.P.;

RELATED MANAGEMENT COMPANY L.P.;

ROSE ASSOCIATES, INC.; RPM LIVING,

LLC; SARES REGIS GROUP COMMERCIAL,

INC.; SECURITY PROPERTIES

RESIDENTIAL, LLC; SHERMAN

ASSOCIATES, INC.; SIMPSON PROPERTY

GROUP, LLC; THRIVE COMMUNITIES

MANAGEMENT, LLC; CROW HOLDINGS,

LP; TRAMMELL CROW RESIDENTIAL

COMPANY; UDR, INC.; WINDSOR

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT COMPANY;

WINNCOMPANIES LLC;

WINNRESIDENTIAL MANAGER CORP.;

AND ZRS MANAGEMENT, LLC.

Defendants.

Case 3:23-md-03071 Document 728 Filed 02/05/24 Page 2 of 302 PageID #: 9022

3

L.P. (collectively, “RealPage”); Apartment Management Consultants, LLC; Avenue5 Residential,

LLC; Bozzuto Management Company; First Communities Management, Inc.; FPI Management,

Inc.; Highmark Residential, LLC; Mission Rock Residential, LLC; Thrive Communities

Management, LLC; and ZRS Management, LLC (collectively the “Managing Defendants”);

Apartment Income REIT Corp., d/b/a Air Communities; Allied Orion Group, LLC; Bell Partners,

Inc.; BH Management Services, LLC; Brookfield Properties Multifamily LLC; Camden Property

Trust; CH Real Estate Services, LLC; CONAM Management Corporation; Cortland Management,

LLC; CWS Apartment Homes LLC; Dayrise Residential, LLC; ECI Group, Inc.; Equity

Residential; Essex Property Trust, Inc.; Greystar Management Services, LLC; Independence

Realty Trust, Inc.; Kairoi Management, LLC; Knightvest Residential; Lantower Luxury Living,

LLC; Lincoln Property Company; Mid-America Communities, Inc., and Mid-America

Apartments, L.P.; Morgan Properties Management Company, LLC; Pinnacle Property

Management Services, LLC; Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc.; The Related Companies, L.P.;

Related Management Company L.P.; Rose Associates, Inc.; RPM Living, LLC; Sares Regis Group

Commercial, Inc.; Security Properties Residential, LLC; Sherman Associates, Inc.; Simpson

Property Group, LLC; UDR, Inc.; Windsor Property Management Company; WinnCompanies

LLC; and WinnResidential Manager Corp. (collectively, “Owner-Operators”); and CONTI Texas

Organization, Inc., d/b/a CONTI Capital; Crow Holdings, LP; and Trammell Crow Residential

Company (collectively “Owners”). 

MF1 IS EVIL EVEN WHEN VIEWED THROUGH A TRADITIONAL REAL ESTATE LENS

 Worth reading for many reasons. MF1 is just one of many. Oh,  BTW, you will hear a lot of traditional investors say that CLO's are more stable than CDO's. That used to be true, but it is not anymore. The market will crash, and it will cause problems for investors. Then we will hear some outrage. And like 2008, taxpayers will finance the bail outs.

https://therealdeal.com/magazine/national-august-2023/when-the-tides-go-out/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR3AsbG4ZvL3_63Ckzm_64Bazi8LzDw0dnRc8SbrVKz2fUFzRB09ceYcLYU_aem_ZmFrZWR1bW15MTZieXRlcw


“You could make an argument the writing was on the wall by the end of 2021, and especially the first quarter of 2022,” one Sun Belt-focused investor said.
Through summer 2022, however, MF1 kept issuing floating-rate loans on deals that hinged on the ability to substantially raise cash flows. Now, across MF1’s almost $11 billion amortizing loan book, almost half of the deals are either watchlisted or delinquent, according to The Real Deal’s analysis of Morningstar data. MF1 declined to comment.
The Tides problem is particularly acute: At least $425 million in MF1-issued loans in its portfolio have landed on servicer watchlists after rising rates hurt cash flow and made it tough for the firm to make interest payments on its debts.
The bulk of MF1’s issued loans come due in the next 18 months, at a time of rising defaults and a dearth of new financing. Lenders will be left to make tough choices — take back the keys or sell loans at a loss.

REAL PAGE SUED

  DOJ Sues Large U.S. Landlords Over Alleged Price-Fixing — ProPublica “While Americans across the country struggled to afford housing, the ...